

Counting Votes for Aggregating Judgments

Patricia Everaere
LIFL – CNRS
Lille, France
patricia.everaere@univ-
lille1.fr

Sébastien Konieczny
CRIL – CNRS
Lens, France
konieczny@cril.fr

Pierre Marquis
CRIL – CNRS
Lens, France
marquis@cril.fr

ABSTRACT

The aim of judgment aggregation is to make collective decisions based on the judgments of individual agents. Some rationality conditions governing the expected behavior of the aggregation function must be considered. However, impossibility theorems show that designing an aggregation function satisfying all desirable properties is not feasible. While some rationality conditions are very natural ones, other ones are more disputable. We show that this is the case of the systematicity condition that prevents from electing issues with more votes than others. Instead, a neutrality condition and a swap optimality condition are promoted. Swap optimality ensures that among two possible results, the one with the best support (number of votes) is chosen. We introduce a new family of judgment aggregation methods based on the support (number of votes) that each issue receives.

Categories and Subject Descriptors

[**Computing methodologies**]: Artificial intelligence: Knowledge representation and reasoning

General Terms

Theory

Keywords

Social choice theory, Judgment aggregation

1. INTRODUCTION

Judgment aggregation is a very active research topic in Social Choice Theory, Political Philosophy and Artificial Intelligence [18, 15, 12, 2, 8, 16, 11, 9, 3]. It aims at making collective decisions on a set of (usually not logically independent) issues from the opinions (judgments) expressed by individuals on these issues. The output of such an aggregation process is one or several social judgment sets, reflecting the opinion of the group of agents on the issues. Much work about judgment aggregation has been devoted to the study of rationality properties for aggregation methods, and the main results are impossibility theorems, showing that no judgment aggregation method satisfies all expected properties [15, 13, 16, 9].

Let us illustrate the difficulties raised up when aggregating judgments by considering a simple example. Consider the three propo-

Appears in: *Alessio Lomuscio, Paul Scerri, Ana Bazzan, and Michael Huhns (eds.), Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2014), May 5-9, 2014, Paris, France.*

Copyright © 2014, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	<i>maj</i>
φ_1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1
φ_2	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1
φ_3	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1

Table 1: A doctrinal paradox

sitional formulae $\varphi_1 = a$, $\varphi_2 = b$, $\varphi_3 = \neg a \vee \neg b$: it is not possible to accept φ_1 , φ_2 and φ_3 together since they are jointly inconsistent. Table 1 reports the opinions of each individual from a group of seven people $\{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7\}$ on those three formulae (1 means "accept" and 0 "reject"). For example, agent 1's judgment is that a is true, that b is also true, and that $\neg a \vee \neg b$ is not true. Each individual opinion is only constrained by a rationality condition of consistency: for any agent, the set of judgments she reports is supposed to be consistent. A natural method to make a collective decision is to use a majority vote: if a majority of agents accepts an issue, then this issue is accepted by the group. Using this method, since a majority of individuals are for φ_1 , for φ_2 and for φ_3 , the decision made by the majority should be $\varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2 \wedge \varphi_3$, which is not consistent. Examples of this kind are called doctrinal paradoxes (see [16] for more details).

While this example illustrates that simple majority vote does not work as an admissible judgment aggregation (JA) method, a key issue is to determine alternative methods to do the job. Echoing impossibility theorems in voting theory, impossibility theorems for judgment aggregation state that there is no method satisfying the full set of expected rationality properties [15, 13, 16, 9]. As a consequence, some rationality conditions must be given up.

Many impossibility theorems consider a property referred to as systematicity, which basically states that the collective judgment on each issue is the same function of individual judgments on that issue, whatever the votes on the other issues. This property may be seen as a way to ensure some form of strategy-proofness: the collective decision cannot be changed by adding or removing some issues of the agenda (this property is related to the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives in voting theory [1]). However, systematicity prevents from considering judgment aggregation as an optimization process: an issue is accepted or rejected independently of the votes on the other issues. Thus, adhering to systematicity may prevent from selecting issues getting more votes than others, because comparison between issues is not allowed. In our opinion, this behaviour is not desirable.

Contrastingly, many existing judgments aggregation methods do not satisfy the neutrality condition, that we consider as a first class requirement. Neutrality intuitively states that all the issues have to be considered on an equal basis, without any priority between them. The premise-based method [18, 2, 6], the conclusion-based method [18, 2, 20], the sequential priority rule [12] violate neutral-

ity, by requiring additional information to make a decision (such as a set of identified premises). Of course, when some additional information are available, such as a distinction between premises and conclusions, or some priority relations between the issues, these extra information have to be taken into account and neutrality must be given up. However, in the remaining case, neutrality is a way to avoid some arbitrariness to take place in the aggregation process. Distance-based methods [19] and more generally the methods based on minimization recently proposed in [11] satisfy it.

In this paper, we first criticize systematicity in presence of neutrality. Chapman [3] also criticizes systematicity, because this property prevents from considering the logical interactions between issues to solve the conflicts. Our work is different from Chapman's because we consider the case when no additional information is available, so neutrality has to be satisfied. We provide both a natural example highlighting the limits of systematicity, and an impossibility theorem showing that it conflicts with other expected rationality properties. Then we define and study judgment aggregation methods which select consistent sets of issues as social judgment sets, based on the support (number of votes) of their elements. As a matter of illustration, on the previous example, one can easily observe that each of φ_1 and φ_2 receives 5 (out of 7) votes, whereas φ_3 receives only 4 votes. While the three issues are accepted by a majority of individuals, the supports of φ_1 and of φ_2 are strictly greater than the one of φ_3 . This can be considered as a sufficient evidence for preferring the judgment set $\{\varphi_1, \varphi_2\}$ (and so $\neg\varphi_3$), to the judgment sets $\{\varphi_2, \varphi_3\}$ and $\{\varphi_1, \varphi_3\}$.

Quite surprisingly, only few JA methods take such support information into account; the most notable exception is Porello-Endriss' method [21], equivalent to Lang et al.'s ranked agenda method [11], which is the instantiation to JA of Tideman's ranked pairs method [23, 26]. This is rather astonishing since, if one interprets these aggregations from an epistemic point of view,¹ then the more votes an issue gets, then the more likely it is (see Section 5 for a more formal discussion).

We introduce the family of Support-based Aggregation Correspondences (SAC). This family gathers methods for which the selection of an issue in a social judgment set depends only on its logical interactions with the other issues and on the level of support it gets from the individuals. We specifically focus on the subset of SAC consisting of ranked majority methods. Such methods select consistent judgment sets based on the number of votes received by their elements. We study the rationality properties offered by these methods both in the general case and for some specific methods. We also discuss the significance of some of the ranked majority methods using truth tracking arguments.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 first gives some formal preliminaries. Some rationality properties for aggregation methods are recalled and discussed in Section 3. SAC and ranked majority methods are defined in Section 4. In Section 5 several ranked majority methods are characterized thanks to truth tracking arguments. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. For space reasons, only the proofs of the main results are furnished.

2. FORMAL PRELIMINARIES

An *agenda* is a finite, non-empty and totally ordered set of non-trivial (i.e., non-contradictory and non-tautological) propositional formulae $X = \{\varphi_1, \dots, \varphi_m\}$.

A *judgment* on a formula φ_k of X is an element of $D = \{1, 0, \star\}$, where 1 means that φ_k is supported, 0 that $\neg\varphi_k$ is supported, \star that neither φ_k nor $\neg\varphi_k$ are supported. A *judgment set* on X is a map-

ping γ from X to D , also viewed as the set of formulae $\{\varphi_k \mid \varphi_k \in X \text{ and } \gamma(\varphi_k) = 1\} \cup \{\neg\varphi_k \mid \varphi_k \in X \text{ and } \gamma(\varphi_k) = 0\}$. For each φ_k of X , γ is supposed to satisfy $\gamma(\neg\varphi_k) = \neg\gamma(\varphi_k)$, where $\neg\gamma$ is given by $\neg\gamma(\varphi_k) = \star$ iff $\gamma(\varphi_k) = \star$, $\neg\gamma(\varphi_k) = 1$ iff $\gamma(\varphi_k) = 0$, and $\neg\gamma(\varphi_k) = 0$ iff $\gamma(\varphi_k) = 1$.

Judgment sets are often asked to be consistent and resolute: a judgment set γ on X is *consistent* iff $\bigwedge_{\{\varphi_k \in X \mid \gamma(\varphi_k)=1\}} \varphi_k \wedge \bigwedge_{\{\varphi_k \in X \mid \gamma(\varphi_k)=0\}} \neg\varphi_k$ is consistent. It is *resolute* iff $\forall \varphi_k \in X$, $\gamma(\varphi_k) = 0$ or $\gamma(\varphi_k) = 1$.

Aggregating judgments consists in associating a collective judgment set with a profile of n individual judgment sets: a *profile* $P = (\gamma_1, \dots, \gamma_n)$ on X is a vector of judgment sets on X . It is *consistent* (resp. *resolute*) when each judgment set in it is consistent (resp. resolute).

For each agenda X , a *judgment aggregation method* δ associates with a profile P on X a non-empty set $\delta(P)$ of judgment sets γ_P on X . When $\delta(P)$ is a singleton for each P , the judgment aggregation method is called a (deterministic) judgment aggregation rule, and it is called a judgment aggregation correspondence otherwise [11].

3. RATIONALITY ISSUES

What are the properties judgment aggregation methods should satisfy? Many intuitions are captured by the following properties.² The first one states that no specific condition must be imposed on the input profile, but consistency:

Universal domain. The domain of δ is the set of all consistent profiles.

This property is often relaxed [15] to:

R-universal domain. The domain of δ is the set of all profiles which are consistent and resolute.

Some properties also state that the result should be consistent and resolute:

Collective rationality. For any profile P in the domain of δ , $\delta(P)$ is a set of consistent collective judgment sets.

Collective completeness.³ For any profile P in the domain of δ , $\delta(P)$ is a set of resolute collective judgment sets.

It is usually expected that agents play symmetric roles:

Anonymity. For any two profiles $P = (\gamma_1, \dots, \gamma_n)$ and $P' = (\gamma'_1, \dots, \gamma'_n)$ in the domain of δ which are permutations one another, we have $\delta(P) = \delta(P')$.

Systematicity states that issues receiving the same support must be treated in the same way:

Systematicity. For any two profiles $P = (\gamma_1, \dots, \gamma_n)$ and $P' = (\gamma'_1, \dots, \gamma'_n)$ in the domain of δ , and any two propositions φ_k and φ_l of X , such that $\forall i \in 1, \dots, n$, $\gamma_i(\varphi_k) = \gamma'_i(\varphi_l)$, if $\gamma_P(\varphi_k) = x$ for all $\gamma_P \in \delta(P)$, then $\gamma_{P'}(\varphi_l) = x$ for all $\gamma_{P'} \in \delta(P')$.

Unanimity states that if all agents agree on the judgment on an issue, then the collective judgment on this issue must be the unanimous one:

Unanimity. Let $x \in \{0, 1\}$. For any $\varphi_k \in X$, if $\forall \gamma_i \in P$, $\gamma_i(\varphi_k) = x$, then for every $\gamma_P \in \delta(P)$, we have $\gamma_P(\varphi_k) = x$.

Note that unanimity on φ_k is trivially satisfied when all agents vote \star for φ_k . In this case it does not seem desirable to force \star for

²Most of these properties are usually stated for judgment aggregation rules and for resolute profiles. We state these properties in the more general setting of judgment aggregation correspondences and without the resoluteness assumption. See [22] for a similar statement.

³Sometimes also called (**collective resoluteness**).

¹Under usual reliability and independence assumptions [4, 14, 7].

the collective decision on this issue, since the value of this issue at the group level may be imposed by the decisions made on other logically related issues.

In order to define the next property which expresses a form of compliance to majority, we need a few preliminary definitions: let g_P^+ , g_P^- and g_P be the majority counting functions from X to \mathbb{Z} given by $g_P^+(\varphi_k) = |\{\gamma_i \in P \mid \gamma_i(\varphi_k) = 1\}|$ and $g_P^-(\varphi_k) = |\{\gamma_i \in P \mid \gamma_i(\varphi_k) = 0\}|$, and $g_P(\varphi_k) = g_P^+(\varphi_k) - g_P^-(\varphi_k)$. These functions can be straightforwardly extended to mappings from $X \cup \{\neg\varphi_k \mid \varphi_k \in X\}$ to \mathbb{Z} so that for any $\varphi_k \in X$, we have $g_P^+(\neg\varphi_k) = g_P^-(\varphi_k)$, $g_P^-(\neg\varphi_k) = g_P^+(\varphi_k)$, and $g_P(\neg\varphi_k) = -g_P(\varphi_k)$.

We can now define formally the majoritarian aggregation rule δ^{maj} , which is the judgment aggregation rule we considered in the example given in the introduction.

DEFINITION 1. *The majoritarian aggregation rule δ^{maj} is defined as follows. For any agenda X and any profile P on X , we have $\delta^{maj}(P) = \{\gamma_P^{maj}\}$, where for any issue $\varphi_k \in X$:*

$$\gamma_P^{maj}(\varphi_k) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } g_P(\varphi_k) > 0 \\ 0 & \text{if } g_P(\varphi_k) < 0 \\ \star & \text{if } g_P(\varphi_k) = 0 \end{cases}$$

We are now in position to define the majority preservation property:

Majority preservation. If γ_P^{maj} is consistent and resolute, then $\delta(P) = \{\delta^{maj}(P)\}$.

Majority preservation⁴ [22] is a very natural property, stating that if the simple majority vote on each issue leads to a consistent and resolute judgment set, then the judgment aggregation correspondence must contain this set, and no other set. The idea is to stick to the result furnished by a simple majority vote when no doctrinal paradox occurs.

Some additional logical properties seem also reasonable for judgment aggregation correspondences. Thus, when all the information available are given by the input profile, it is expected that issues play symmetric roles:

Neutrality. If $X = \{\varphi_1, \dots, \varphi_m\}$ and $X' = \{\varphi'_1, \dots, \varphi'_m\}$ are two agendas such that there exists a permutation σ over $\{1, \dots, m\}$ satisfying $\varphi_k = \varphi'_{\sigma(k)}$ for every $k \in 1, \dots, m$, then for any profiles $P = (\gamma_1, \dots, \gamma_n)$ on X and $P' = (\gamma'_1, \dots, \gamma'_n)$ on X' such that for every $i \in 1, \dots, n$, for every $k \in 1, \dots, m$, $\gamma_i(\varphi_k) = \gamma'_i(\varphi'_{\sigma(k)})$, we have $\delta(P) = \delta(P')$.

We want to stress that this neutrality property is different from the one usually considered in judgment aggregation, where systematicity is equivalent to the two properties of independence and “neutrality” [15]. Both properties differ even in the restricted case of resolute profiles. The usual “neutrality” property is a weakening of systematicity, and is far from the standard meaning of neutrality in vote theory, which is the one we want to capture by our property. The problem of usual “neutrality”⁵ is similar to the one of systematicity: it does not consider the logical relationship between the issues, whereas two formulas with the same votes should have to be treated differently depending of their relationship with other ones. Consider the example of the introduction (see Table 1), with an additional formula $\varphi_4 = c$, with the same vector of votes as φ_3 (i.e. 0 0 0 1 1 1). As explained in the introduction φ_3 has to be rejected because φ_1 and φ_2 are incompatible with φ_3 and have better supports. φ_4 has exactly the same votes as φ_3 , so “neutrality”

⁴Called strong majority preservation in [22].

⁵ (“neutrality”) $\forall \varphi, \varphi' \forall P$ if $(\forall i \gamma_i(\varphi) = \gamma_i(\varphi'))$ then $\gamma_P(\varphi) = \gamma_P(\varphi')$.

demands that they are treated the same way. But φ_4 has a majority of votes (4 out of 7), and no logical links with other formulas, so there is no reason for rejecting it.

Finally, let us define the swap $\gamma_P|_S$ of a collective judgment set γ_P with respect to a set of issues $S \subseteq X$ as $\gamma_P|_S(\varphi_k) = \gamma_P(\varphi_k)$ if $\varphi_k \notin S$, and $\gamma_P|_S(\varphi_k) = \neg\gamma_P(\varphi_k)$ if $\varphi_k \in S$. We may consider the following property:

Swap optimality. If $\gamma_P \in \delta(P)$, then there are no $\varphi_k, \varphi_l \in X$ such that $\gamma_P|_{\{\varphi_k, \varphi_l\}}$ is consistent and

$$\max(g_P^+(\neg\varphi_k), g_P^+(\neg\varphi_l)) > \max(g_P^+(\varphi_k), g_P^+(\varphi_l))$$

Swap optimality requires that the selection of collective judgment sets depends on the number of votes received by each issue. So if one can consistently replace in a collective judgment set any pair of formulae of the agenda by their negations, then one should not get a better number of votes for any of these two negated formulae. This property ensures that most supported formulae are chosen from a profile, when it is possible to do so. R-swap optimality is the relaxation of swap optimality where only resolute profiles P are considered. In this case, the expression of the swap optimality condition is simpler:

R-swap optimality. If P is resolute and $\gamma_P \in \delta(P)$, then there are no $\varphi_k, \varphi_l \in X$ such that $\gamma_P|_{\{\varphi_k, \varphi_l\}}$ is consistent and $g_P^+(\varphi_k) + g_P^+(\varphi_l) < n$, where n is the number of agents in the profile.

This simpler expression allows one for a better understanding of what swap optimality means. Overall, R-swap optimality aims at keeping the most supported issues in the selected result: if $g_P^+(\varphi_k) + g_P^+(\varphi_l) < n$ and if it is possible to swap φ_k to $\neg\varphi_k$ and φ_l to $\neg\varphi_l$ in the profile, then the profile with the two negated formulae would receive strictly more votes than the initial one.

It turns out that all these properties are not jointly compatible. We first recall the impossibility theorem of [15] (for judgment aggregation rules only).

PROPOSITION 1 ([15]). *There exists no judgment aggregation rule that satisfies R-universal domain, collective rationality, collective completeness, systematicity and anonymity.*

This theorem is quite negative, but it relies on some strong assumptions. First is the resoluteness (completeness) assumptions of the individuals (R-universal domain), that can be criticized, since one cannot expect all agents to have an opinion on all possible issues; this is also the case of the collective completeness property, that is helpful for making decisions, but forces to make some choices even when there is no evidence enough to do so. Thus the collective completeness requirement imposes sometimes to discriminate further some judgment sets, using additional information not given in the input profile. As such, it conflicts with the anonymity and neutrality conditions. Suppose for instance a perfect tie (say, about a unique issue φ in the agenda, with 4 votes for and 4 votes against it), why and how to make a distinction between φ and $\neg\varphi$? See [8] for criticisms on the collective completeness property.

The systematicity property is also highly criticizable. It prevents from considering judgment aggregation as an optimization process trying to achieve a best compromise, which is often expected for aggregation methods. The following example illustrates it:

EXAMPLE 1. *Let us consider an agenda X composed of the following six formulae: $\varphi_1 = (\neg a \vee \neg b \vee \neg c \vee \neg d \vee \neg e)$, $\varphi_2 = a$, $\varphi_3 = b$, $\varphi_4 = c$, $\varphi_5 = d$, $\varphi_6 = e$. Let us consider the profiles P and P' on this agenda, as given by Table 2. In the (resolute) profile P , every formula has a majority of votes, so using*

P	φ_1	φ_2	φ_3	φ_4	φ_5	φ_6	P'	φ_1	φ_2	φ_3	φ_4	φ_5	φ_6
1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1'	0	1	1	1	1	1
2	1	1	1	0	1	1	2'	0	1	1	1	1	1
3	1	1	1	1	0	1	3'	0	1	1	1	1	1
4	1	1	1	1	1	0	4'	0	1	1	1	1	1
5	1	0	1	1	1	1	5'	1	0	0	0	0	0
6	1	0	1	1	1	1	6'	1	0	0	0	0	0

Table 2: Profiles P and P'

simple majority vote all the formulae have to be selected, which would lead to an inconsistent collective judgment set. So (at least) one of the six formulae has to be rejected by the judgment aggregation correspondence. There is a unanimity for φ_1 , so it seems sensible to select φ_1 in the result. All the other formulae except φ_2 are quasi-unanimously accepted (they get all votes but one). The least supported formula is φ_2 , so the expected result is $\gamma_P = \{\varphi_1, \neg\varphi_2, \varphi_3, \varphi_4, \varphi_5, \varphi_6\}$.

Consider now the profile P' . Simple majority vote leads to a consistent collective judgment set $\gamma_{P'} = \{\neg\varphi_1, \varphi_2, \varphi_3, \varphi_4, \varphi_5, \varphi_6\}$, which thus appears as the expected result. So, though the individual judgments are the same ones in both profiles for φ_2 , in the expected result for P $\neg\varphi_2$ is selected, whereas for P' φ_2 is selected. Since φ_2 gets the same votes pros and cons in the two profiles, no judgment aggregation method satisfying systematicity is allowed to make such a distinction.

This example illustrates clearly that the individual judgments on an issue cannot be considered independently from those for the other issues. This requirement conflicts with those supported by the other rationality conditions, leading to the following impossibility theorem:

PROPOSITION 2. *There is no judgment aggregation correspondence that satisfies R-universal domain, unanimity, majority preservation, R-swap optimality, and systematicity.*

PROOF. Consider Example 1, and a judgment aggregation correspondence satisfying universal domain, unanimity, majority preservation and swap optimality. As this judgment aggregation correspondence satisfies universal domain, the two profiles are acceptable. From the unanimity assumption, φ_1 has to be in the result for the first profile. Since the six formulae are not jointly consistent, the negation of at least one of them has to be chosen. Using the swap optimality assumption, φ_2 must be rejected because its support is lower than the one of $\varphi_3, \varphi_4, \varphi_5$ or φ_6 . For the second profile, the majority preservation assumption forces the result, as the majoritarian rule gives a consistent judgment set: $\neg\varphi_1, \varphi_2, \varphi_3, \varphi_4, \varphi_5$ and φ_6 is the result. This judgment aggregation correspondence selects $\neg\varphi_2$ for the first profile, φ_2 for the second profile, whereas the support of φ_2 is exactly the same one in both profiles. Hence this correspondence does not satisfy systematicity. \square

COROLLARY 1. *There is no judgment aggregation correspondence that satisfies universal domain, unanimity, majority preservation, swap optimality, and systematicity.*

We want to stress that systematicity, which is often presented as the counterpart of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) for voting methods (surely because Dietrich and List [5] have shown that when one wants to express Arrow's Theorem in a judgment aggregation setting, using propositions to encode the preference relation, then IIA leads to the related independence property), actually is stronger than IIA (see [17] for a similar statement). For this reason, systematicity is set aside in the rest of the paper: we now

look for judgment aggregation correspondences satisfying universal domain, collective rationality, anonymity, neutrality, majority preservation, unanimity, and swap (or R-swap) optimality. In the next section, we prove that such a correspondence exists.

4. SUPPORT-BASED JUDGMENT AGGREGATION

Let us now point out a general family of judgment aggregation correspondences for which the selection of consistent collective judgment sets is based only on the support obtained by their elements. To achieve this goal, let us first introduce a few definitions:

DEFINITION 2. *Given an agenda $X = \{\varphi_1, \dots, \varphi_m\}$, a potential solution $M = \langle \alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_m \rangle$ is a vector such that each α_k is either φ_k or $\neg\varphi_k$, and $\bigwedge_{i=1}^m \alpha_i$ is consistent. M_X is the set of all potential solutions given X .*

Obviously, there is a direct equivalence between the potential solutions and the consistent and resolute collective judgment sets. Observe that M_X is never empty.

DEFINITION 3. *Given a profile P on X , the support set of P is the set $ss(P) = \{\{\varphi_i, g_P^+(\varphi_i), g_P^-(\varphi_i)\} \mid \varphi_i \in M\} \mid M \in M_X\}$.*

Thus, the support set of a profile P reports the evidence pro and against every issue of X , for each potential solution given X .

DEFINITION 4. *A Support-based Aggregation Correspondence (SAC) δ is a judgment aggregation correspondence such that there exists a mapping f such that for any consistent profile P on X , $\delta(P) = f(ss(P))$.*

The definition of SAC therefore calls simply the result of the aggregation process for each agenda to be determined solely by the votes for or against each issue, and the way issues interact, logically speaking (no further information such as a classification of formulae into premises and conclusions are taken into account).

Clearly enough, each SAC already satisfies a number of properties of interest:

PROPOSITION 3. *Every SAC satisfies universal domain, collective rationality, anonymity and neutrality.*

While the majoritarian aggregation rule δ^{maj} defined previously is not a SAC since it does not satisfy the collective rationality condition, we can easily define a SAC based on it, and more generally, on qualified majority methods (quota methods):⁶

DEFINITION 5. *Let q be any integer. The q -quota aggregation rule δ^{Qq} is defined as follows. For any agenda X , and any profile P on X , we have $\delta^{Qq}(P) = \{\gamma_P^{Qq}\}$, where for any $\varphi \in X$:*

$$\gamma_P^{Qq}(\varphi) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } g_P(\varphi) > q \\ 0 & \text{if } g_P(\varphi) < q \\ * & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

The SAC δ_{sac}^{Qq} associated with δ^{Qq} is defined as $\delta_{sac}^{Qq}(P) = \{M \in M_X \mid \text{if } \gamma_P^{Qq}(\varphi) = 1, \text{ then } \varphi \in M \text{ and if } \gamma_P^{Qq}(\varphi) = 0, \text{ then } \neg\varphi \in M\} \mid \text{if } \gamma_P^{Qq} \text{ is consistent, and } \delta_{sac}^{Qq}(P) = M_X \text{ otherwise.}$

⁶ δ^{maj} is the 0-quota aggregation method δ^{Q0} .

The $\delta_{sac}^{Q_q}$ methods clearly suffers from a lack of accuracy whenever $\gamma_P^{Q_q}$ is inconsistent (all the potential solutions are kept in this case).

Let us now introduce a specific family of SAC which does not exhibit this drawback, the family of ranked majority methods. For such correspondences, the selection of potential solutions is based on their aggregated score:

DEFINITION 6. The score vector of a potential solution $M = \langle \alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_m \rangle$ given P is the vector of votes in favor of the issues selected by this potential solution:

$$s(M) = (g_P^+(\alpha_1), \dots, g_P^+(\alpha_m)).$$

Note that $s(M)$ is defined using only the "positive" support g_P^+ of issues. There is no need to consider the "negative" support g_P^- as well, since the negations of formulae from X are also considered in other potential solutions.

DEFINITION 7. An aggregation function is a mapping⁷ \oplus from \mathbb{R}^m to \mathbb{R} , which satisfies:

- If $x_i \geq x'_i$, then **(non-decreasingness)**
 $\oplus(x_1, \dots, x_i, \dots, x_m) \geq \oplus(x_1, \dots, x'_i, \dots, x_m)$
- $\oplus(0, \dots, 0) = 0$ **(minimality)**
- If σ is a permutation over $\{1, \dots, m\}$, then **(symmetry)**
 $\oplus(x_1, \dots, x_m) = \oplus(x_{\sigma(1)}, \dots, x_{\sigma(m)})$

Some additional properties can also be considered for the \oplus function:

- If $x_i > x'_i$, then **(strict increasingness)**
 $\oplus(x_1, \dots, x_i, \dots, x_m) > \oplus(x_1, \dots, x'_i, \dots, x_m)$
- If $\oplus(x_1, \dots, x_m, z) \geq \oplus(y_1, \dots, y_m, z)$ **(decomposition)**
then $\oplus(x_1, \dots, x_m) \geq \oplus(y_1, \dots, y_m)$
- If $\forall i \in 1, \dots, m+1, z > y_i$ then **(strict preference)**
 $\oplus(z, x_1, \dots, x_m) > \oplus(y_1, \dots, y_{m+1})$

DEFINITION 8. A ranked majority judgment aggregation method $\delta^{RM\oplus}$ associates with every profile P on agenda X the set of potential solutions with the greatest score vector w.r.t. the \oplus aggregation function, i.e., $\delta^{RM\oplus}(P) = \{M \in M_X \mid \nexists M' \in M_X \text{ s.t. } \oplus(s(M')) > \oplus(s(M))\}$.

PROPOSITION 4. Every ranked majority judgment aggregation method is a SAC.

Some judgment aggregation methods pointed out in the literature belong to the family of ranked majority judgment aggregation methods. Thus, the maxweight subagenda rule introduced in [11] is the ranked majority method with $\oplus = \Sigma$. This particular method also has a distance-based characterization, since it actually selects the consistent judgment sets that minimize the Hamming distance w.r.t. the judgment profile. But other ranked majority judgment aggregation methods (in the general case, i.e., when $\oplus \neq \Sigma$) are not distance-based ones. Another method defined in [11], namely the operator δ^{RA} , is not a ranked majority method but $\delta^{RM_{leximax}}$ (which is a ranked majority judgment aggregation method) refines δ^{RA} . Other meaningful aggregation functions can be used to give rise to other ranked majority methods. Let us mention for instance *max*, *min*, *leximax*, *leximin*,⁸ Σ^n (the sum of the n^{th} powers), etc.

⁷Strictly speaking, it is a family of mappings, one for each m .

⁸The standard *leximax* and *leximin* functions can be encoded numerically using Ordered Weighted Averages functions [24, 10] to comply with Definition 7.

Let us introduce a last aggregation function, that will allow us to define an interesting ranked majority judgment aggregation method.

DEFINITION 9. Given a positive number q , let maj_q be the aggregation function given by:

$$maj_q(x_1, \dots, x_n) = |\{x_i > q \mid i \in \{1, \dots, n\}\}|$$

For any profile P on X , let us define Maj as $maj_{\lfloor \frac{|P|}{2} \rfloor}$.

Ranked majority methods $\delta^{RM_{maj_q}}$ select the potential solutions with the highest aggregated score, where the score of a solution is the number of formulae in it which are supported by a majority (which depends on the value of q). Interestingly, $\delta^{RM_{Maj}}$ differs from each of $\delta^{RM_{leximax}}$, $\delta^{RM_{leximin}}$, and $\delta^{RM_{\Sigma}}$:

EXAMPLE 2. Let $X = \{\varphi_1, \varphi_2, \varphi_3, \varphi_4\}$ be the agenda with $\varphi_1 = a$, $\varphi_2 = b$, $\varphi_3 = (a \vee b) \wedge c$ and $\varphi_4 = (\neg a \vee \neg b) \wedge d$, and let the profile P on X be given by the following table.

	φ_1	φ_2	φ_3	φ_4
1	1	0	1	1
2	1	0	0	1
3	1	1	0	0
4	1	1	1	0
5	1	1	0	0
6	0	1	0	1
7	0	1	1	1

Each of M_1, M_2, M_3 below is a potential solution given P :

- $M_1 = \langle \varphi_1, \varphi_2, \varphi_3, \neg\varphi_4 \rangle$, and
 $s(M_1) = (5, 5, 3, 3)$
- $M_2 = \langle \varphi_1, \neg\varphi_2, \neg\varphi_3, \varphi_4 \rangle$, and
 $s(M_2) = (5, 2, 4, 4)$
- $M_3 = \langle \neg\varphi_1, \varphi_2, \neg\varphi_3, \varphi_4 \rangle$, and
 $s(M_3) = (2, 5, 4, 4)$

Each of M_2 and M_3 is strictly preferred to M_1 when Maj is the aggregation function since they contain 3 formulae with a majority whereas M_1 contains only 2 formulae with a majority. Such a conclusion cannot be drawn when *leximax*, *leximin* or Σ are used: each of $\delta^{RM_{leximax}}$, $\delta^{RM_{leximin}}$, and $\delta^{RM_{\Sigma}}$ selects M_1 .

Let us now study the rationality conditions satisfied by ranked majority methods $\delta^{RM_{\oplus}}$:

PROPOSITION 5. • Any $\delta^{RM_{\oplus}}$ satisfies universal domain, collective rationality, anonymity and neutrality.

- If \oplus satisfies strict increasingness, then $\delta^{RM_{\oplus}}$ satisfies majority preservation.
- If \oplus satisfies strict preference and decomposition, then $\delta^{RM_{\oplus}}$ satisfies unanimity and swap optimality.

PROOF. We give the proof for the third result, the proofs for the two first results are much easier.

- If \oplus satisfies strict preference and decomposition, then $\gamma^{RM_{\oplus}}$ satisfies unanimity.

Let φ be a formula supported by all agents, n be the number of agents. There is a potential solution M_u which contains all the formulae supported by all agents (since agents are supposed to report consistent judgment sets). Consider another potential solution M , and suppose that M does not contain φ . Let $(n, \dots, n, x_1, \dots, x_k)$ be the score of M_u and $(n, \dots, n, y_1, \dots, y_{k+l})$ be the score of M , with $l \geq 1$ (we know that $s(M)$ contains at least one n less than $s(M_u)$, as φ is in M_u and not in M). As $\forall i, n > y_i$, $\oplus(n, x_1, \dots, x_k) > \oplus(y_1, \dots, y_{k+l})$ (strict preference). Thanks to decomposition, we obtain $\oplus(n, \dots, n, x_1, \dots, x_k) > \oplus(n, \dots, n, y_1, \dots, y_{k+l})$ (in the remaining case, if $\oplus(n, \dots, n, x_1, \dots, x_k) \leq \oplus(n, \dots, n, y_1, \dots, y_{k+l})$, with decomposition we get $\oplus(n, x_1, \dots, x_k) \leq \oplus(y_1, \dots, y_{k+l})$: contradiction).

With non-decreasingness, we get $\oplus(n, \dots, n, y_1, \dots, y_{k+l}) \leq \oplus(n, \dots, n, y_1, \dots, y_{k+1})$, because $y_{k+2} \leq n, \dots, y_{k+l} \leq n$. Then the result holds: $\oplus(n, \dots, n, x_1, \dots, x_k) > \oplus(n, \dots, n, y_1, \dots, y_{k+1})$.

\dots, y_{k+l}). Equivalently, $\oplus(s(M_u)) > \oplus(s(M))$, and φ is chosen.

• If \oplus satisfies strict preference and composition, then $\gamma_{RM_{\oplus}}$ satisfies swap optimality.

Suppose $\gamma_P \in \delta(P)$, and $\varphi_k, \varphi_l \in X$ such that $\gamma_P|_{\{\varphi_k, \varphi_l\}}$ is consistent and $\max(s(\neg\varphi_k), s(\neg\varphi_l)) > \max(s(\varphi_k), s(\varphi_l))$. Since \oplus satisfies strict preference $\oplus(s(\neg\varphi_k), s(\neg\varphi_l)) > \oplus(s(\varphi_k), s(\varphi_l))$. Then using decomposition $\oplus_{\varphi_i \in X, i \neq k, l}(s(\varphi_i), s(\neg\varphi_k), s(\neg\varphi_l)) > \oplus_{\varphi_i \in X, i \neq k, l}(s(\varphi_i), s(\varphi_k), s(\varphi_l))$: $\gamma_P|_{\{\varphi_k, \varphi_l\}}$ is selected and not γ_P , contradiction. There is no $\varphi_k, \varphi_l \in X$ such that $\gamma_P|_{\{\varphi_k, \varphi_l\}}$ is consistent and $\max(s(\neg\varphi_k), s(\neg\varphi_l)) > \max(s(\varphi_k), s(\varphi_l))$: swap optimality is satisfied. \square

As expected, the systematicity property is not satisfied by $\delta_{RM_{\oplus}}$ in the general case (this is an easy consequence of Theorem 1 and Proposition 5). However, the remaining properties can be jointly satisfied, leading thus to a "possibility theorem":

PROPOSITION 6. $\delta_{RM_{leximax}}$ satisfies universal domain, majority preservation, anonymity, unanimity, collective rationality, neutrality and swap optimality.

The next proposition illustrates the importance of the completeness condition on the input profile:

PROPOSITION 7. If P is a resolute profile, then $\delta_{RM_{leximax}}(P) = \delta_{RM_{leximin}}(P)$.

PROOF. For space reasons, we give only a sketch of the proof. The first point is to prove that the lexicographic order between two vectors is not changed if the identical values are retrieved from these vectors. The relative order between two potential solutions M_1 and M_2 is then characterized by the elements of $M_1 \Delta M_2$ (the symmetric difference of both sets). Suppose that $M_1 \Delta M_2 = \{\varphi_1, \dots, \varphi_k\}$. The score of each formula φ_i in the first solution M_1 is $g_P^+(\varphi_i)$. Suppose that $g_P^+(\varphi_1) \geq \dots \geq g_P^+(\varphi_k)$. M_2 contains $\neg\varphi_i$, of score $g_P^+(\neg\varphi_i) = n - g_P^+(\varphi_i)$, thus $g_P^+(\neg\varphi_k) \geq \dots \geq g_P^+(\neg\varphi_1)$. Thus the score of φ_i is at rank j in the ordered score vector associated with M_1 iff the score of φ_i is at rank $m - j$ in the ordered score vector associated with M_2 .

When we compare M_1 and M_2 using *leximax*, the scores are sorted in descending order. Suppose for example that $M_1 >_{leximax} M_2$. Then there is $i \in [1, k]$ s.t. $g_P^+(\varphi_1) = g_P^+(\neg\varphi_k) \dots g_P^+(\varphi_{i-1}) = g_P^+(\neg\varphi_{k-i+1})$ and $g_P^+(\varphi_i) > g_P^+(\neg\varphi_{k-i})$. When we compare M_1 and M_2 using *leximin* the scores are sorted in ascending order. For M_1 the vector of scores we have to consider is $(g_P^+(\varphi_k), \dots, g_P^+(\varphi_1))$ and for M_2 it is $(g_P^+(\neg\varphi_1), \dots, g_P^+(\neg\varphi_k))$. Since for $l \in [1, i - 1]$, $g_P^+(\varphi_l) = g_P^+(\neg\varphi_{k-l+1})$, we have $g_P^+(\neg\varphi_l) = g_P^+(\varphi_{k-l+1})$. So $g_P^+(\neg\varphi_1) = g_P^+(\varphi_k) \dots g_P^+(\neg\varphi_{i-1}) = g_P^+(\varphi_{k-i+1})$ and $g_P^+(\neg\varphi_i) < g_P^+(\varphi_{k-i})$: $M_2 <_{leximin} M_1$: the order between M_1 and M_2 is the same one, whatever *leximax* or *leximin* is considered. \square

This result is surprising, since *leximax* and *leximin* are quite different operators: with *leximin*, more importance is given to the minimal values, whereas with *leximax*, more importance is given to the maximal values. Thus, for irresolute profiles $\delta_{RM_{leximax}}$ and $\delta_{RM_{leximin}}$ lead usually to different results. This illustrates again the fact that the "no abstention" hypothesis is not a harmless technical simplification; indeed, it may change the results drastically in the sense that methods which differ in general may coincide when only resolute judgment sets are considered.

Some additional results are obtained by focusing on specific ranked majority methods:

PROPOSITION 8. • $\delta_{RM_{\Sigma}}$ satisfies universal domain, anonymity, neutrality, majority preservation, collective rationality and R-swap optimality. It satisfies neither unanimity nor swap optimality.

• $\delta_{RM_{Maj}}$ satisfies universal domain, anonymity, neutrality, majority preservation, collective rationality. It satisfies neither unanimity nor R-swap optimality.

• $\delta_{RM_{leximin}}$ satisfies universal domain, anonymity, neutrality, majority preservation, collective rationality, unanimity and R-swap optimality. It does not satisfy swap optimality.

PROOF. We give only some proofs, due to space limitations.

• $\delta_{RM_{\Sigma}}$ does not satisfy unanimity.

Consider the following agenda: $a, \varphi_1 = a \rightarrow \neg b \vee \neg c, b, c, \varphi_2 = a \rightarrow \neg d \vee \neg e, d, e, \varphi_3 = a \rightarrow \neg f \vee \neg g, f, g, \varphi_4 = a \rightarrow \neg h \vee \neg i, h, i$ and three voters:

a	φ_1	b	c	φ_2	d	e	φ_3	f	g	φ_4	h	i
1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0
1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1
1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1

Consider any potential solution M_a containing a . As a is in M_a , one of the three formulae $a \rightarrow \neg b \vee \neg c, b$ or c has to be withdrawn from M_a . Similarly, one formula among $a \rightarrow \neg d \vee \neg e, d, e$ (resp. $a \rightarrow \neg f \vee \neg g, f, g$, resp. $a \rightarrow \neg h \vee \neg i, h, i$) has to be withdrawn. The support of M_a is $s(M_a) = (3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1)$, and its aggregated score is 23. Consider now any potential solution $M_{\neg a}$ containing $\neg a$. Then each of the three formulae $a \rightarrow \neg b \vee \neg c, b$ and c can be kept. Similarly for $a \rightarrow \neg d \vee \neg e, d, e$ (resp. $a \rightarrow \neg f \vee \neg g, f, g$, resp. $a \rightarrow \neg h \vee \neg i, h, i$). So the support of $M_{\neg a}$ is $s(M_{\neg a}) = (2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 0, 0)$ and its aggregated score is 24.

Accordingly $M_{\neg a}$ is selected by $\delta_{RM_{\Sigma}}$, and unanimity is not satisfied.

• $\delta_{RM_{\Sigma}}$ does not satisfy swap optimality.

We consider the following example:

$(a \leftrightarrow b)$	1	1	0	0	0	*	*
a	*	*	*	1	0	1	*
b	*	*	*	0	1	*	1

The score of the potential solution $M_1 = \{a, b, a \leftrightarrow b\}$ is $s(M_1) = (2, 2, 2)$ and $\Sigma(s(M_1)) = 6$. It is easy to check that $\Sigma(s(M_2)) = 4$, where $M_2 = \{\neg a, \neg b, a \leftrightarrow b\}$, and $\Sigma(s(M_3)) = \Sigma(s(M_4)) = 6$ where $M_3 = \{a, \neg b, \neg(a \leftrightarrow b)\}$ and $M_4 = \{\neg a, b, \neg(a \leftrightarrow b)\}$. $\gamma_{RM_{\Sigma}}$ selects M_1, M_3 and M_4 . However, M_1 contains formulae a and $a \leftrightarrow b$ whose supports are lower than the support of $\neg a$: $\max(g_P^+(\neg a), g_P^+(\neg(a \leftrightarrow b))) > \max(g_P^+(a), g_P^+(a \leftrightarrow b))$. $\gamma_{RM_{\Sigma}}$ does not satisfy swap optimality.

• $\delta_{RM_{leximin}}$ satisfies unanimity.

Suppose that a formula φ is supported by all agents, and let M be a potential solution containing all unanimously supported formulae (M exists because each agent gives a consistent judgment set). Let M' be another potential solution containing $\neg\varphi$. The score of $\neg\varphi$ is 0, since each agent supports φ . Then the score of M' contains at least one 0, whereas the score of M does not (since M contains all unanimously supported formulae). As a consequence, $s(M') <_{leximin} s(M)$, and all unanimously supported formulae are in all elements of $\delta_{RM_{leximin}}(P)$. \square

5. CHOOSING RELIABLE SOLUTIONS

Besides rationality properties, another criterion for selecting a judgment aggregation method is its capacity to truth tracking. This capacity is assessed as the probability to point out the "true" collective judgment set, assuming that the individuals are reliable, i.e., each agent is more likely to vote in favour of an issue which is true than abstaining or rejecting the issue. More formally, suppose that there is a true judgment set γ^* on X , i.e., $\gamma^*(\varphi_k) = 1$ when φ_k is true, and $\gamma^*(\varphi_k) = 0$ otherwise. An agent i is said to be *reliable* if for any issue $\varphi_k \in X$, $P(\gamma_i(\varphi_k) = \gamma^*(\varphi_k)) > 0.5$.

As usual for truth tracking analysis [4, 14, 7], a number of assumptions has to be made. Thus the n agents are supposed to make their decisions independently of others (assumption of individuals independence) and independently of decisions made on other issues (assumption of issues independence). Furthermore, for the sake of simplicity, an homogeneity assumption is often made, stating that the probability of an agent to make the right choice on an issue is the same one, whatever the agent and the issue, i.e., $\forall i \in \{1, \dots, n\}, \forall k \in \{1, \dots, m\}, P(\gamma_i(\varphi_k) = \gamma^*(\varphi_k)) = p$.

These hypotheses are the same ones as those considered in Condorcet's Jury Theorem [4, 14] for voting. This theorem states that for a given issue φ_k , if the individuals are reliable, homogeneous and independent, then the most probable judgment on φ_k is the one supported by a majority of individuals; and if the size of the profile tends to infinity, then the probability to determine the "true" judgment on the issue tends to 1. The Jury Theorem is actually one of the main justifications of our ranked majority methods; indeed, the assumptions underlying this theorem imply that the more supported an opinion on an issue the more likely this opinion.

Now that this is stated, our purpose is to determine whether the truth tracking criterion can be used to discriminate further the ranked majority methods. In order to answer this question, one considers it as a maximum likelihood estimation problem: the aim is to determine the judgment aggregation methods which best explain the observed individual judgments, under the above assumptions.

PROPOSITION 9. *Under the assumptions of individuals independence, homogeneity, reliability and issues independence, the judgment aggregation method giving the maximum likelihood estimation of the profile P on X is $\delta_{RM\Sigma}$.*

PROOF. In order to show this result, we prove that under the assumptions of individuals independence, homogeneity, and issues independence, the probability that the profile $P = (\gamma_1, \dots, \gamma_n)$ is observed when the potential solution $M = (\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_m)$ is the true one M^* is (with $c(M) = \sum_{i=1}^m g_P^+(\alpha_i)$):

$$P(P = (\gamma_1, \dots, \gamma_n) \mid M = M^*) = p^{c(M)}(1-p)^{n \cdot m - c(M)}.$$

$$P(P = (\gamma_1, \dots, \gamma_n) \mid M = M^*) = P(P_1^1 = \gamma_1(\varphi_1) \cap P_1^2 = \gamma_1(\varphi_2) \cap \dots \cap P_1^m = \gamma_1(\varphi_m) \cap P_2^1 = \gamma_2(\varphi_1) \cap \dots \cap P_n^m = \gamma_n(\varphi_m) \mid M = M^*).$$

Since \cap is commutative and associative:

$$P(P = (\gamma_1, \dots, \gamma_n) \mid M = M^*) = P(P_1^1 = \gamma_1(\varphi_1) \cap P_2^1 = \gamma_2(\varphi_1) \cap \dots \cap P_n^1 = \gamma_n(\varphi_1) \cap P_1^2 = \gamma_1(\varphi_2) \cap \dots \cap P_n^m = \gamma_n(\varphi_m) \mid M = M^*).$$

Using the independence assumption between formulae, we get:

$$P(P = (\gamma_1, \dots, \gamma_n) \mid M = M^*) = P(P_1^1 = \gamma_1(\varphi_1) \cap P_2^1 = \gamma_2(\varphi_1) \cap \dots \cap P_n^1 = \gamma_n(\varphi_1) \mid M = M^*) \cdot P(P_1^2 = \gamma_1(\varphi_2) \cap \dots \cap P_n^2 = \gamma_n(\varphi_2) \mid M = M^*) \cdot \dots \cdot P(P_1^m = \gamma_1(\varphi_m) \cap \dots \cap P_n^m = \gamma_n(\varphi_m) \mid M = M^*).$$

Taking advantage of the independence assumption between agents, since exactly $c(\alpha_1)$ agents among the n agents gives the right value

(probability $p > 0.5$ because of the reliability assumption) and the $n - c(\alpha_1)$ remaining ones do not (probability $1 - p$), we get:

$$P(P_1^1 = \gamma_1(\varphi_1) \cap P_2^1 = \gamma_2(\varphi_1) \cap \dots \cap P_n^1 = \gamma_n(\varphi_1) \mid M = M^*) = p^{c(\alpha_1)}(1-p)^{n-c(\alpha_1)}$$

And then:

$$P(P = (\gamma_1, \dots, \gamma_n) \mid M = M^*) = p^{c(\alpha_1)}(1-p)^{n-c(\alpha_1)} \cdot \dots \cdot p^{c(\alpha_m)}(1-p)^{n-c(\alpha_m)} = p^{c(M)}(1-p)^{n \cdot m - c(M)}.$$

Since the $\delta_{RM\Sigma}$ method selects the potential solutions M which maximize the score $c(M) = \sum_{i=1}^m g_P^+(\alpha_i)$, it gives the maximum likelihood estimation of the profile P . \square

Thus $\delta_{RM\Sigma}$ is the best method among judgment aggregation methods (and not only among ranked majority methods) for identifying the true solution, under the assumptions made.

As we mentioned above, the assumptions above are quite standard ones when voting methods are considered [25]. The most debatable one is the assumption of issues independence, which is not satisfied in many cases:

EXAMPLE 3. *Consider two formulae, $\varphi_1 = a \wedge b$ and $\varphi_2 = \neg a$. If an agent votes for φ_1 , we know that she does not support φ_2 (since φ_2 is inconsistent with φ_1). Hence $P(g_P^+(\varphi_1) = k_1 \wedge g_P^+(\varphi_2) = k_2)$ is different from $P(g_P^+(\varphi_1) = k_1) \cdot P(g_P^+(\varphi_2) = k_2)$.*

In this case, the assumption of issues independence is not satisfied,⁹ so $\delta_{RM\Sigma}$ is no longer justified as the best choice for a judgment aggregation method. Accordingly, we now get rid of the assumption of issues independence while still considering the problem of discriminating the ranked majority methods thanks to maximum likelihood estimations. A good point is that, even when the assumption of issues independence does not hold, a given issue is as likely as the number of votes it receives is high. This means that truth tracking can be done on an issue-by-issue basis, but then we have to make decisions based on a vector of more or less supported (hence more or less likely) formulae.

Intuitively, three very natural policies consists then in favoring judgment sets containing as much as possible issues supported by a majority, or in favoring judgment sets containing as much as possible most likely issues, or finally in favoring judgment sets containing as few as possible less likely issues. Formally:

DEFINITION 10. *A judgment aggregation method δ satisfies the **Best/Card/Worst** policy iff, for any profile P , all the potential solutions of $\delta(P)$ are preferred to the other potential solutions w.r.t. **Best/Card/Worst** criterion.*

Card *A potential solution M is preferred to a potential solution M' w.r.t. the **Card** criterion iff $|\{\alpha_k \in M \mid g_P^+(\alpha_k) > n/2\}| > |\{\alpha_k \in M' \mid g_P^+(\alpha_k) > n/2\}|$.*

Best *A potential solution M is preferred to a potential solution M' w.r.t. the **Best** criterion iff $\exists \alpha_k \in M$ s.t. $\forall \alpha_l \in M', g_P^+(\alpha_k) > g_P^+(\alpha_l)$.*

Worst *A potential solution M is preferred to a potential solution M' w.r.t. the **Worst** criterion iff $\exists \alpha_l \in M'$ s.t. $\forall \alpha_k \in M, g_P^+(\alpha_k) > g_P^+(\alpha_l)$.*

⁹Note that a similar assumption of issues independence is made when maximum likelihood is used for defining the best preference order by aggregation methods in voting theory, despite the fact that similar problematic cases can be pointed out (see e.g. [25]).

The preferred judgment sets w.r.t. the three criteria do not coincide in the general case. According to the **Card** criterion the judgment sets containing a maximal number of issues supported by a majority of agents, hence a maximal number of likely issues, are selected. However, this does not prevent from selecting judgment sets containing issues having a very low support, and avoiding issues which are very supported. Worse, when the number of abstentions is high, it can be the case that no issue at all is supported by a majority of agents. In this case, **Card** is not discriminative enough. Alternative choices are given by the **Best** criterion and the **Worst** criterion, which evaluates respectively the likelihood of a judgment set as the best (worst) support of an issue in it. Thus **Best** (resp. **Worst**) corresponds to an optimistic (resp. pessimistic) evaluation of a judgment set. The following proposition shows that for each policy among **Best/Card/Worst**, there is a ranked majority correspondence which satisfies it:

PROPOSITION 10. • $\delta_{RM_{Maj}}$ satisfies the **Card** policy.

• $\delta_{RM_{leximax}}$ satisfies the **Best** policy.

• $\delta_{RM_{leximin}}$ satisfies the **Worst** policy.

6. CONCLUSION

This paper gathers a number of results concerning the judgment aggregation problem. The main contributions are:

- A discussion of the rationality properties of judgment aggregation, especially a criticism of the systematicity property, and the introduction of a new property (swap optimality).
- An impossibility theorem.
- A new family of judgment aggregation methods, the support-based aggregation correspondences, for which the selection of consistent collective judgment sets is based only on the supports obtained by their elements. We specifically focus on the subset of ranked majority methods, and prove them to satisfy most of the expected rationality properties.
- A truth-tracking justification of some operators of this family.

This work opens several perspectives. One of them consists in considering other rationality postulates for judgment aggregation (as responsiveness and monotonicity, considered in [9]) and then to identify the maximal sets of properties which can be jointly satisfied, to go from impossibility theorems to "possibility theorems".

Acknowledgments

This work benefited from the support of the AMANDE project of the French National Research Agency (ANR-13-BS02-0004).

7. REFERENCES

- [1] K. J. Arrow. *Social Choice and Individual Values*. Wiley, New York, second edition, 1963.
- [2] L. Bovens and W. Rabinowicz. Democratic answers to complex questions. *Synthese*, 150:131–153, 2006.
- [3] B. Chapman. Rational aggregation. *Politics, Philosophy, and Economics*, 1:337–354, 2002.
- [4] M. Condorcet. *Essai sur l'application de l'analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix*. Imprimerie Royale, Paris, 1785.
- [5] F. Dietrich and C. List. Arrow's theorem in judgment aggregation. *Social Choice and Welfare*, 29(1):19–33, 2007.
- [6] F. Dietrich and P. Mongin. The premiss-based approach to judgment aggregation. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 145(2):562–582, 2010.
- [7] P. Everaere, S. Konieczny, and P. Marquis. The epistemic view of belief merging: Can we track the truth? In *Proceedings of ECAI'10*, pages 621–626, 2010.
- [8] P. Gärdenfors. An Arrow-like theorem for voting with logical consequences. *Economics and Philosophy*, 22(2):181–19, 2006.
- [9] D. Grossi and G. Pigozzi. Introduction to judgment aggregation. In *Lectures on Logic and Computation*, volume 7388 of *LNCS*, pages 160–209. Springer, 2012.
- [10] S. Konieczny, J. Lang, and P. Marquis. DA^2 merging operators. *Artificial Intelligence*, 157:49–79, 2004.
- [11] J. Lang, G. Pigozzi, M. Slavkovic, and L. V. D. Torre. Judgment aggregation rules based on minimization. In *Proceedings of TARK'11*, pages 238–246, 2011.
- [12] C. List. A model of path-dependence in decisions over multiple propositions. *American Political Science Review*, 98(3):495–513, 2004.
- [13] C. List. The theory of judgment aggregation: an introductory review. *Synthese*, 187:179–207, 2012.
- [14] C. List and R. Goodin. Epistemic democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet jury theorem. *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 9(3):277–306, 2001.
- [15] C. List and P. Pettit. Aggregating sets of judgments. an impossibility result. *Economics and Philosophy*, 18:89–110, 2002.
- [16] C. List and C. Puppe. Judgment aggregation: A survey. In P. Anand, C. Paul, and P. Pattanaik, editors, *The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice*. Oxford University Press, 2009.
- [17] M. Pauly and M. Hees. Logical constraints on judgement aggregation. *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, 35(6):569–585, 2006.
- [18] P. Pettit. Deliberative democracy and the discursive dilemma. *Philosophical Issues*, 11:268–299, 2001.
- [19] G. Pigozzi. Belief merging and the discursive dilemma: an argument-based account to paradoxes of judgment aggregation. *Synthese*, 152(2):285–298, 2006.
- [20] G. Pigozzi, M. Slavkovic, and L. van der Torre. A complete conclusion-based procedure for judgment aggregation. In *Proceedings of ADT'09*, volume 5783 of *LNCS*, pages 1–13. Springer, 2009.
- [21] D. Porello and U. Endriss. Ontology merging as social choice. In *Proceedings of CLIMA-2011*, volume 6814 of *LNAI*, pages 157–170. Springer-Verlag, July 2011.
- [22] M. Slavkovic. *Judgment Aggregation in Multiagent Systems*. PhD thesis, Université du Luxembourg, 2012.
- [23] T. N. Tideman. Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules. *Social Choice and Welfare*, 4(3):185–206, 1987.
- [24] R. R. Yager. On ordered weighted averaging aggregation operators in multicriteria decisionmaking. *IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics*, 18(1):183–190, 1988.
- [25] H. P. Young. Condorcet's theory of voting. *The American Political Science Review*, 82(4):1231–1244, 2003.
- [26] T. M. Zavist and T. N. Tideman. Complete independence of clones in the ranked pairs rule. *Social Choice and Welfare*, 6(2):167–173, 1989.