Angelina Vidali (UPMC-LIP6)
joint work with Annamária Kovács, Goethe University, Frankfurt/M, Germany.
My talk deals with the important problem of globally characterizing truthful mechanisms where players have multiparameter valuations like scheduling unrelated machines or combinatorial auctions. Very few mechanisms are known for these multi-parameter settings and the question is: Can we prove that no other truthful mechanisms exist? We characterize truthful mechanisms for n players and 2 tasks for multiple settings: scheduling unrelated machines, combinatorial auctions where the players have additive or subadditive or submodular valuations and all items have to be allocated: A truthful mechanism is either task-independent or a player-grouping minimizer, a new class of mechanisms we discover and which generalizes affine minimizers.
Bio: Angelina Vidali is a Postdoctoral Research at UPMC-LIP6. Her research lies in the intersection of computer science and economics and focuses on understanding strategic behavior in in electronic markets, scheduling of complicated tasks, cloud computing and crowdsourcing, and designing mechanisms that give incentives to selfish agents to report their true types and perform computation tasks exerting full effort.
She received her PhD from the Department of Informatics of the University of Athens (Greece), advised by Elias Koutsoupias. She also held Postdoctoral Researcher Positions at the Max Planck Institute for Informatics (Germany), at the University of Vienna (Austria) and at Duke University (USA). At Duke she organized an interdisciplinary seminar series (Departments of Economics, Computer Science and Fuqua School of Business) sponsored by Yahoo.
Her research and studies have been supported by grants from the Vienna Science and Technology Fund, the Alexander von Humboldt foundation, the Alexandros Onassis foundation, the University of Athens, the Greek State Scholarship Foundation and the Greek Secretariat for Research and Technology.